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is paper presents experimental evidence in support of the existence of metalin-
guistic moral encroachment: the inuence of the moral consequences of using a
word with a given content upon the content of that word. e evidence collected
implies that the eect of moral factors upon content is weak. e implications of
this for Esa Díaz-León’s recent attempt to show how Jennifer Saul can legitimately
reject an empirical semantic hypothesis on political grounds are described. Direc-
tions for future research are also described.
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1. e Meta-semantics of context-sensitivity
On the one hand, there is compositional truth-conditional semantics: an at-
tempt to identify the contribution made by a word to the truth-condition of
the sentences of which it (the word) is a part. On the other hand, there is
meta-semantics. Whereas compositional truth-conditional semantics is the
study of those linguistic meanings that words have, meta-semantics, as we
will use the term, is the study of the factors that determine themeanings that
words have. For instance, suppose the meaning of a name is an object (its
referent).en the factors that determine the meaning of a particular name
are those factors that determine which object the name denotes.ese fac-
Corresponding author’s address: Alex Davies, Department of Philosophy, Institute of
Philosophy and Semiotics, University of Tartu, Ülikooli 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia. Email:
alex.stewart.davies@gmail.com.
1 e pre-registration of the two experiments, the data collected and the R-code
used to analyse the data are all available here: https://osf.io/z4rg2/?view_only=
2a771bcbd27445f9824e90317fc9f403
© All Copyright Authors
Studia Philosophica Estonica (2019) 12, 7–33 
Published online: December 2019
Online ISSN: 1736–5899
www.spe.ut.ee
http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/spe.2019.12.1.XX
8 Meta-Semantic Moral Encroachment: Some Experimental Evidence
tors could be the psychological states of the name’s user, or a causal-historical
relation to the environment of the word’s use, or something else.
Some expressions have context-invariantmeanings but context-sensitive
contents. For instance, the word “tall” has a meaning that allows its content
to varywith the context inwhich theword is used. For this reason, it is possi-
ble for the extension of the word to change even though the world described
using the word does not change. In one context, a boy of 1.5 metres may
fall within the extension of “tall”, whereas in another context, he does not.
One area of meta-semantic inquiry is the factors that determine the con-
tents of context-sensitive expressions in context: which features of the con-
text shape the contents of context-sensitive expressions, and in what way do
they do this shaping? Examples of theories in this area include: the view that
speaker intentions x the content of context-sensitive expressions in context
(e.g. Predelli 1998, Predelli 2011, Åkerman 2015); the view that agreement be-
tween relevant language users determines the content of context-sensitive
expressions in context (e.g. King 2014, Michaelson 2014); and the view that
the broader purposes of the user of an expression determine the content of
the context-sensitive expression in context (e.g. Davies 2018, Dobler 2019,
Lewis forthcoming and Schoubye and Stokke 2016).
is paper addresses itself to a recent proposal in this area of meta-
semantic inquiry (the area that pertains to how the content of context-
sensitive expressions is xed by and in context). Díaz-León (2016) has pro-
posed that the moral consequences of using a context-sensitive expression
with a given content, in a given context, have a bearing upon the content
the expression has in context: she proposes that there exists (what we may
reasonably call) a form of meta-linguistic moral encroachment (a label that
alludes to similar ideas in the epistemic contextualist literature on prag-
matic (e.g. DeRose 2009, Fantl and McGrath 2009) and moral encroach-
ment (Fritz 2017). Díaz-León puts forward a proposal which implies that if
the moral consequences of using an expression in a particular context with
a content c1 are worse than the moral consequences of using an expression
in that context with a content c2, then the content of the expression in that
context is more likely to be c2 than c1. However, Díaz-León does not herself
present empirical evidence in favour of this proposal. e purpose of the
current paper is to present empirical evidence that bears upon the truth of
Díaz-León’s proposal. Two experiments were conducted with the aim of ex-
amining the hypothesis thatmeta-linguisticmoral encroachment is a feature
of the meta-semantics of context-sensitive expressions. Although an eect
was indeed found (the moral valence of a context inuences the truth-value
judgements of language users), this eect was weak. As we will see in what
follows, the eect’s weakness suggests that although Díaz-León’s proposal
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may well be correct, it may well not be correct to the degree required for
Díaz-León’s dialectical purposes.
e paper will proceed in the following stages. In section 2, we out-
line Díaz-León’s proposal in greater detail, and explain why it implies the
existence of meta-linguistic moral encroachment. In section 3, we describe
the experimental arrangement common to the two experiments described
in this paper. In section 4, we report experiment 1. In section 5, we report
experiment 2. In section 6, we describe how the ndings of the two experi-
ments can be built upon in future research.
2. e context of Díaz-León’s proposal
Díaz-León (2016) makes a proposal about the meta-semantics of the word
“woman”, given that the word has the contextualist semantics described by
Saul (2012). Saul’s contextualist theory of the meaning of the word “woman”
is presented as a truth-condition for sentences of the form “X is a woman”:
X is a woman is true in a context C i X is human and relevantly
similar (according to the standards at work in C) to most of those
possessing all of the biological markers of female sex. (Saul 2012, 201)
A meaning for the word “woman” is not provided by either Saul or Díaz-
León. But it is easy enough to infer one from this truth-condition. Let us
suppose that “ABMFS” denotes a function from objects to truth-values, such
that it maps x to true i x possesses all the biological markers of female sex.
Let us also suppose that “SIMILAR” denotes a function from contexts c to
functions from objects z to functions from objects y, to truth-values such
that the nal function maps to true i z is similar to y by the standards of
c—which is to say, that “SIMILAR” denotes a character in Kaplan’s sense.2
en:
«woman»= λz.λc.∣{x ∶ABMFS(x)}∩{y ∶SIMILAR(c)(z)(y))}∣> ∣{x ∶ABMFS(x)} − {y ∶SIMILAR(c)(z)(y)}∣
e denotation requires that the cardinality of the intersection of the set of
those who possess all the biological markers of female sex and those who are
similar to z by the standards of c is greater than the cardinality of the set of
those who possess all the biological markers of female sex but who are not
similar to z by the standards of c.us, because of the presence of SIMILAR
in its denotation, “woman” denotes a character also—which is what makes
this a contextualist analysis.
Saul adopts this contextualist analysis of the meaning of “woman” (in
part) on the ground that it allows her to account for the fact that users of
2 Here we use “«»” to specify the translation of “«woman»” into lambda calculus.
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“woman” will in one context consider a trans woman a woman, and in an-
other context, they will not. But Saul voices a concern about the analy-
sis: her own political view is that one should respect trans women’s self-
identications (presumably: in all contexts). And one does not do this if
one allows that denials that a trans woman is a woman are true. For this
reason, Saul wishes to reject her own contextualist analysis of the meaning
of “woman.”us, Saul seems to be led to reject a semantic analysis not on
the basis of the standard empirical grounds used in the assessment of a se-
mantic hypothesis (namely, the empirical adequacy of the hypothesis), but
rather, on political grounds. Although Saul sketches several ways in which
this might be a permissible thing to do, nonetheless, at rst glance, decid-
ing whether to maintain an empirical hypothesis on political grounds seems
very much to be the doing of something impermissible.
Díaz-León aims to show how Saul can permissibly keep her analysis
without having to grant that utterances of sentences of the form “X is not a
woman”, where X is a trans woman, are true. If Díaz-León is successful, then
Saul would not face pressure to reject the contextualist analysis on political
grounds. Díaz-León proceeds by modifying (or perhaps, more accurately:
precisifying) themeta-semantics of Saul’s analysis: namely, by, in eect, pro-
viding us with more information about the particular shape of the function
SIMILAR. SIMILAR is a function from contexts to contents. Dierences in
context result in the return of dierent contents. But how content depends
on context is not specied by Saul. Díaz-León makes a proposal about how
we should specify this:
My proposal, then, is that we should understand the relevant stan-
dards at issue in a context as those that are relevant for practical pur-
poses (where these are broadly conceived to include theoretical, pru-
dential, moral, political, and even aesthetic values). (Díaz-León 2016,
249)
Díaz-León is here putting forward a purpose-centred meta-semantics for
“woman”: a meta-semantics in the same vein as that defended by Davies
(2018), Dobler (2019), Lewis (forthcoming) and Schoubye and Stokke (2016).
However, distinctive of Díaz-León’s proposal is the reference to moral and
political values. Díaz-León is proposing that the content of “woman” in a
context is constrained by which content would best servemorally and polit-
ically justied or permitted purposes. Hence if, in a given context, we use
“woman”, and content CON best serves the morally and politically justied
or permitted purposes of the context, thenCON is the content of “woman” in
this context. In eect then, Díaz-León proposes that there is no gap between
what content a word actually has and the content a word ought to have. It is
common to posit such a gap in the conceptual ethics literature (e.g. Burgess
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and Plunkett 2013 and Haslanger 2012). Díaz-León is proposing that what
content “woman” has, and what content “woman” morally speaking ought
to have, are the very same thing. For if they were the same thing, then Saul’s
political considerationswould be straightforward evidence bearing upon the
content of “woman” in context. ese political considerations would be no
dierent, for instance, froman appeal to the presence and direction of a hand
gesture, when we are attempting to discern the content of “that” as used in a
context, or, for instance, from an appeal to the chemical structure of water,
when we are attempting to discern the content of “water” (given the truth of
natural kind semantic externalism).
However, Díaz-León does not provide evidence in favour of this pro-
posal. She does consider how her proposal can handle a pair of objections
Saul considers against her own contextualist analysis. But no positive em-
pirical support is given for Díaz-León’s proposal.is is a dialectically awk-
ward fact. For, although there is certainly room in philosophy for proposals
qua explorations of logical space, whose truth can be explored further in
subsequent work, in this particular dialectical context, Saul’s concern is that
illegitimate factors are inuencing her study of semantics and Díaz-León
presents herself as providing a way to avoid this inuence. But if Díaz-León’s
proposal itself is put forward for political reasons (because Díaz-León too
feels moral pressure not to recognize denials that a trans woman is a woman
as true), thenDíaz-León ismerelymoving the bump to another corner of the
rug: from semantics to meta-semantics. If Díaz-León provides no evidence
in favour of her proposal, the concern that she adheres to a meta-semantic
proposal for moral and political reasons is very much in place.
Suppose we were interested in nding evidence that bears upon the cor-
rectness of Díaz-León’s meta-semantic proposal. What would that evidence
look like? In what follows, we are going to assume that if contextual moral
factors play a role in xing the content of “woman” in context, then they
play a role in xing the content of context-sensitive expressions in general
i.e. that an ad hoc proposal is not being made about “woman”, but rather
that a general proposal is being made about context-sensitivity. Given this,
and given that meta-semantics is as empirical a matter as semantics, if Díaz-
León’s proposal is correct then we should expect that speakers’ judgements
about the truth of a context-sensitive sentence are sensitive to the perceived
moral consequences of using words in the sentence with given contents.
We should expect speakers to modulate their use and interpretation of the
context-sensitive sentence in light of the moral consequences of the sen-
tence having a given interpretation. For instance, if a speaker of English,
Fred, thinks that endangering the safety of trans women is morally prob-
lematic, and if a consequence of using “woman” so that trans women do
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not fall within its extension has the consequence that trans women’s safety
is endangered, then we would expect, if Díaz-León’s proposal is correct, that
Fred will use “woman” with a content ensures that trans women are included
within the word’s extension.
3. Experimental setup common to experiment 1 and experiment
2
We conducted two experiments which were aimed at uncovering conrm-
ing evidence for Díaz-León’s proposal. e two experiments each had the
same structure.is structure followed the use of so-called “context-shiing
thought experiments” from the philosophical literature on context-sens-
itivity but as deployed in an experimental arrangement previously deployed
by Hansen and Chemla (2013). Standard (i.e. non-experimental) context-
shiing thought experiments are presentedwithin philosophical papers.e
reader is shown a scenario which describes the use of a sentence S in a con-
text.e author of the paper oers the reader their favoured judgement as to
the truth-value of S.e reader is then presented with a second scenario in
which S is used.e author then, once again, oers the reader their favoured
judgement as to the truth-value of S. e author’s favoured judgement will
switch between the two scenarios: in one scenario the judgement will be
that S is false, in the other, that it is true. However, within each of the two
contexts in which S is used, the object to which the sentence is applied will
not have changed any of its properties. From this it is concluded that what
is required for S to be true must have changed between the two contexts in
which it is used. Examples of the provision of such scenarios and the reason-
ing just described can be found summarized in chapter 1 of Cappelen and
Lepore (2005). Here is one example.
Story I: Smith is quite proud of the results of the rigorous diet he has
followed. He has lost easily 15 kg. Stepping on the scales onemorning,
he notes with satisfaction that they register a thick hair or two below
80 kilos. At the oce, he proudly announces, “I now weigh 80 kilos.”
But the tiresome Melvin replies, “What! In that heavy tweed suit?
Not very likely.” and, pulling a bathroom scale out of his bottom desk
drawer and pushing Smith on to it, notes with satisfaction, “Look. 83
and a bit.” (For good measure, let us suppose Smith not yet to have
taken o his overcoat, so that the scale actually reads 86.) Of course,
we would say, what Melvin has demonstrated does not count against
what Smith said. (Contrasting) Story II: Smith, dressed in the last way,
is about to step into a crowded elevator. “Wait a minute.”, someone
says, “is elevator is really very delicate. We can only take 80 more
kilos.” “Coincidentally, that’s exactly what I weigh.”, replies Smith. In
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he steps, and down they plummet. So it appears that what Smith said
this time is false. (Travis 1985, 199–200)
It is true that, in this example, the sentence used is not exactly the same in
the two contexts. But correction for this inadequacy does not dampen the
eect.
e judgements used in support of postulating context-sensitivity have
been disputed (e.g. Berg 2002). Partly because they have been disputed,
some philosophers have deployed experimental methods in order to discern
how widespread and stable the intuitions of Travis and others are. And they
have indeed been found to be robust (more robust, in fact, than the intuition
that the verb “know” is context-sensitive (cf. Hansen and Chemla 2013 and
Grindrod et al. 2019, though for recent further investigation into this nding
see Francis et al. 2019). An advantage of experimental context-shiing ex-
periments over the thought experiments presented in philosophical papers
is that one does not have to suggest judgements to the participants of the
experiments. Instead of expressing any judgement about scenarios, judge-
ments of experiment participants are simply requested, collected, and anal-
ysed.
If participants’ judgements are sensitive to the perceived moral conse-
quences of the use of a word with a given content, then if we cause dier-
ences in the perceived moral consequences of the use of a word between
two conditions, we should thereby be able to cause dierences in partici-
pants’ judgements about the content of that word.ere are various ways to
cash out the idea that a use of a word has moral consequences. In the exper-
iments reported in this paper, we will cash out the idea as follows. We are
going to be interested in sentences whose truth would help justify an action,
where this action is in one context, morally bad, and in another context, not.
What we are going to be interested in is whether we can see dierences in
truth-value judgements across the two contexts: can the use of a sentence
to justify a morally suspect act lead interpreters of the sentence to rescind
from judging the sentence true? Our hypothesis is that the answer to this
question is “yes”: if a sentence is used to justify a morally suspect act, in-
terpreters will judge the sentence to be less true.3 Given that that which the
sentence is being used to describe is identical across the two contexts, such
a dierence in truth-value judgement would ceteris paribus be evidence that
the content of the sentence is being understood dierently across the dier-
ent contexts, which in turn would constitute evidence that themoral valence
of the context is a factor that inuences the content of a word in context.
3 In the experiments reported in this paper, participants were asked to provide truth-value
judgements along a scale that ranges between false and true.
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Each of the two experiments described in this paper included the use
of three scenario topics and to each scenario topic corresponded two moral
valences: bad and OK. In a version of a scenario with a morally bad valence,
the target sentence is being used to justify a morally questionable action.
In a version of a scenario with a morally OK valence, the target sentence is
being used to justify a morally OK action. In each experiment, two of the
three scenarios were test conditions, and one was a control condition that
was used to check whether participants were indeed attending to the task.
Following the paradigm employed by Hansen and Chemla (2013), each ex-
periment was designed to allow for both within- and between- subject com-
parisons.is was achieved in the following way. Each participant of an ex-
periment saw all scenarios (all topics, and both valences of each topic).is
allows for within-subject comparison. But in addition, comparisons were to
be made between subjects for the rst scenario that each participant saw:
i.e. the scenario which a participant saw without seeing any others. ese
between-subject comparisons allow us to see whether dierences of context
can inuence speakers’ truth-value judgements before they become aware
of what contextual factors might be aecting their truth-value judgements;
and similarly, they allow us to see whether dierences of context can inu-
ence speakers’ truth-value judgements even if they are potentially aware of
what contextual factors might be aecting their truth-value judgements.
Prior to both experiments, a power analysis was conducted usingMonte
Carlo simulations and data collected from a pilot study.e pilot study had a
very small sample size (39 for the “woman” scenarios, and 35 for the a “green”
scenarios). To achieve power of 0.8 in the “woman” scenario, it was found
that a sample size of approximately 270 participants would be needed. Given
that a between-subject design was intended as well as a within-subject de-
sign, and given that the between-subject designwould divide the sample size
by 4, it was decided to recruit as many participants as could reasonably be
aorded: around 400 for each experiment. is would be more than suf-
cient for the within-subject design, but it was recognized even before the
experiments were conducted, that such a sample size is less than sucient
to detect an eect for the between-subject design. Nonetheless, since the
between-subject comparisons would be comparisons using a subset of the
data collected for the within-subject comparisons, little is lost in making the
between-subject comparisons.
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4. Experiment 1: “woman”, “yellow”, and “strong enough”
4.1 Participants
411 participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk.4 To in-
crease the likelihood of recruiting native English speakers, only participants
with IP addresses in Canada and the United States were allowed to partici-
pate. To reduce the likelihood of inadvertently recruiting bots (following the
Mturk bot-scare of 2018 APS 2018), only persons who had completed more
than 1000 prior tasks, and only those who had had 97% of those prior tasks
approved, were permitted to participate in this experiment.
ere was a check on whether participants’ native language was English.
5 participants were excluded from data analysis because they reported not
having English as their native language.is brought the sample size down
to 406—prior to removing participants who failed the control.
4.2 Materials
4.2.1 Control check: “strong enough”
e control check consisted of a pair of scenarios.ese both had a morally
OK valence and in both the sentence “that stick is not strong enough” was
used to make a statement about a stick that would take the weight of thou-
sands of ants, but not of a human being. However, in one scenario the stick
is about to be used to carry the weight of thousands of ants, whereas in the
other scenario, the stick is about to be used to carry the weight of a human
being. In the rst scenario, the sentence should be judged false, whereas in
the second scenario, it should be judged true.e control scenarios were as
follows:
Morally OK / True Scenario
Tia and Tony have been lost in the jungle for days. eir food
supply is running low. ey have reached a deep ravine that
they must cross if they are to get out of the jungle alive. ey
begin searching for a way to cross the ravine. Tony nds a stick
which is about as thick as a matchbox but the length of a car,
and so just about reaches across the ravine. Although the stick
would take the weight of many thousands of ants, it would not
take the weight of a human being. Tia and Tony are discussing
whether to use the stick. Tia laughs and says “that stick is not
strong enough.” Tony puts down the stick and they continue
searching.
4 For an assessment of the quality of data collected fromMturk see (Sprouse 2011).
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Morally OK / False Scenario
Tia and Tony are building a large-scale landscape for ants.ey
want it to be possible for the ants to move across a ditch that is
lled with water.ese ants cannot swim. So it is important to
build some kind of bridge. Tony nds a stick which is about as
thick as a matchbox but the length of a car, and so just about
reaches across the ditch. Although the stick would not take the
weight of a human being, it would carry the weight of many
thousands of ants. Tia and Tony are discussing whether to use
the stick. Tia laughs and says “that stick is not strong enough.”
Tony puts down the stick and they continue searching.
e target sentence includes the word “strong”, a relative gradable adjective.
Relative gradable adjectives are known to be context-sensitive (Kennedy
1997). us, the target sentence should allow variation in content. If Díaz-
León’s proposal is correct, we should expect moral valence to have an eect
on interpretations of the target sentence.
4.2.2 “woman”
e contrast in moral valence between the two scenarios with the topic
“woman” lay in whether a trans woman was about to be coerced into a men’s
public toilet in a world where she faced a high risk of violence therein
(morally bad valence), or instead, into a men’s public toilet in a world where
she faced no such risk (morally OK valence). We realize that the ethics of
the situation are more complex than matters of safety. But this nonetheless
seemed like a facet of the matter which may arouse more consensus than
others. Consensus is important to maintain if we are to retain a large sample
size once we have removed those who saw no dierence of moral valence
between the scenarios which nominally diered in moral valence. e dif-
ferently valenced woman topic scenarios were as follows:
“woman” —Morally bad
A trans woman is a person who was born with a male body
but who identies as, or perceives themselves to be, a woman.
Imagine a world in which trans women face a very large risk
of signicant physical and potentially sexual violence in men’s
public toilets. Imagine that, in this world, a guard stands at the
entrance to some public toilets to ensure that everyone pays. A
trans woman approaches the toilets. e trans woman heads
towards the women’s toilets. e guard intervenes. e guard
says: “Wait. You’re not a woman. You have to use the men’s
toilets.”
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“woman” —Morally OK
A trans woman is a person who was born with a male body
but who identies as, or perceives themselves to be, a woman.
Imagine a world in which trans women face absolutely no risk
of physical or sexual violence in men’s public toilets—they’re
quite safe there. Imagine that, in this world, a guard stands at
the entrance to some public toilets to ensure that everyone pays.
A trans woman approaches the toilets.e trans woman heads
towards the women’s toilets. e guard intervenes. e guard
says: “Wait. You’re not a woman. You have to use the men’s
toilets.”
We use this target sentence because we are assuming Saul’s contextualist
analysis of the meaning of “woman.”
4.2.3 “yellow”
e contrast between themorally bad andmorally OK valences for the topic
“yellow” lay in whether a CEO’s decision not to buy golden delicious apples
from a given county (Tudru) as a matter of personal whim would have dev-
astating eects upon the local economy and well being of the county. In the
morally bad valenced scenario, the consequences would be terrible. In the
morally OK valenced scenario, there would be no negative consequences.
Whilst many will think both morally OK or both morally bad, it was ex-
pected that a sizeable portion of participants would think there is a moral
contrast between the two valences.e dierently valenced scenarios were
as follows:
“yellow” — morally bad
Suppose that TudruCounty’s economywould collapse if Big Su-
permarket Chain did not buy their golden delicious apples—
there would be high unemployment, extensive poverty and a
collapse of the community and tax-base. TudruCounty’s golden
delicious apples all have 1 or 2mild red splotches on their other-
wise yellow skins. But the CEO of Big Supermarket Chain per-
sonally prefers golden delicious apples with pure yellow skins,
even though his clients are completely indierent to whether
the apples have perfectly yellow skins. When examining golden
delicious apples from Tudru County, the CEO says, “is apple
is not yellow. We won’t be buying apples from Tudru County.”
“yellow” — morally OK
Suppose that Tudru County’s economy would be entirely unaf-
fected if Big Supermarket Chain did not buy their golden de-
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licious apples—other companies would buy the apples instead.
Tudru County’s golden delicious apples all have 1 or 2 mild red
splotches on their otherwise yellow skins. But the CEO of Big
Supermarket Chain personally prefers golden delicious apples
with pure yellow skins, even though his clients are completely
indierent to whether the apples have perfectly yellow skins.
When examining golden delicious apples from Tudru County,
the CEO says, “is apple is not yellow. We won’t be buying ap-
ples from Tudru County.”
“Yellow” is again a gradable colour adjective. Although it is standard to as-
sume that relative gradable adjectives are context-sensitive, it is currently a
matter of debate whether colour adjectives are relative or absolute (see Clapp
2012, Hansen 2011, Hansen and Chemla 2017, Kennedy and McNally 2005,
McNally 2011). However, there is compelling evidence that, regardless of
this dispute, colour adjectives are context-sensitive (seeHansen andChemla
2013). We expect then that, if Díaz-León’s proposal is correct, then colour ad-
jectives have a content that is sensitive to inuence from the moral valence
of the context.
4.3 Arrangement
e six scenarios (three topics, each with two valences) were presented in
an almost random order: “almost” because the controls never appeared rst.
is was done to increase the sample size for the between-subject com-
parisons—which would divide participants according to the rst scenario
they saw. If controls were allowed to appear rst (as well as the test scenar-
ios), then we would needlessly reduce the size of the sample for each of the
test scenarios. Notice that all target sentences are negative in polarity. is
was done to ensure that whatever dierences in response that are found be-
tween conditions, it cannot be said that a switch of polarity was the cause of
that dierence.
For each scenario (of each moral valence), two questions were asked.
e rst question checked the participant’s interpretation of the moral va-
lence of the scenario. e second question asked the participant to assess
the truth of the target sentence. Both answers were to be given using a slid-
ing scale: in the rst case from “Disagree” to “Agree”, and in the second case
from “False” to “True”. For example, in the Woman scenario, the following
questions were asked:
Moral Valence Check
Please use the sliding scale to indicate to what extent you agree
with the following statement: “It is ethicallywrong for the guard
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to force the transwoman to use themen’s public toilets when the
trans woman faces a large risk of physical or sexual violence in
those toilets.”[SCALE LABELS: DISAGREE — AGREE]
Truth-value judgement
e scenario above is the same as before. But now look at the
underlined utterance and its context. Bearing in mind its con-
text, assess whether the underlined utterance is true (Your an-
swer may be subtle. Please use the sliding scale to specify your
answer).[SCALE LABELS: FALSE — TRUE]
Scales were used in order to reap ordinal variables. Categorical questions
(yes/no questions) would have reaped only nominal variables. is facili-
tates the use of more informative analysis than would otherwise be possible.
4.4 Results
Participants were excluded on the basis of the control scenarios if they did
not judge the true sentence true (placing the marker on the scale higher
than halfway), and the false sentence false (placing the marker on the scale
lower than halfway). 233 participants passed the control. Everyone else was
excluded from subsequent analysis.
For each scenario (“woman” and “yellow”), participants were excluded
if they did not interpret each scenario’s nominally morally bad version as
morally bad, and each scenario’s morally OK version as morally OK.is
exclusion was required because we are interested in whether the dierence
in the moral valence of the scenarios, as understood by the participants, can
inuence participants’ interpretations of the truth-conditions of sentences
used in those scenarios.
Unexpectedly, this check radically reduced the sample size: for the
“woman” scenario, to 31, and for the “yellow” scenario to 93.is is well be-
low the sample size required to detect any eect of the size expected, given
our pilot studies. Unsurprisingly all dierences in truth-value judgements
between versions of scenarios with negative andOKmoral valence (for both
within- and between-subject comparisons) were not signicant. To save
space, these results are not reported in any further detail.
4.5 Discussion
e failure of this experimental design to maintain a reasonable sample size
aer control checks, and aer reduction of the sample to those who adopted
the expected switch of interpretation of the valence of same-topic scenarios,
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led to attempts to discern ways to improve the design so as to sustain the
sample size. Two ways to do this were identied. Firstly, the length of the
scenarios should be reduced. Given that participants sourced from Mturk
will be working for money, and given that time is money, a reduction in the
amount of time required to fully understand a scenario (by reducing the sce-
narios’ word count) should improve performance. Secondly, the dierences
inmoral valence intended for both the woman and yellow scenarios were re-
ally quite controversial: thismeant that a substantial reduction in sample size
is highly likely when we attend only to those who exhibit a shi in valence
interpretation in accordance with our expectations.e morality of forcing
a trans woman to use men’s toilets in countries such as the US and Canada
(where unisex toilets are not the norm) is likely to be a divisive topic for
participants from those countries, where participants are likely to have xed
moral views regardless of dierences of safety. Similarly, whether a company
CEO is doing anything wrong in guiding his company as he wishes (even if
his wishes have strong negative consequences for a particular local econ-
omy) is likely to split participants into the more libertarian and the more
egalitarian, who again, will not shi their moral assessment of the situation
across the nominally dierent valences. We can sustain a larger sample size
by deploying less controversial dierences of moral valence, on which there
is likely to be a large consensus that there is indeed a dierence of moral
valence across each version of each topic scenario.
5. Experiment 2: “a lot of cake”, “old”, and “short”
5.1 Participants
399 participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. As with
experiment 1, only participants with IP addresses in Canada and the United
States were allowed to participate. Only persons who had completed more
than 1000 prior tasks, and only those who had had 98% of those prior tasks
approved, were permitted to participate in this experiment.ose who had
participated in experiment 1 were also excluded.
3 participants were excluded from analysis because they reported not
having English as their native language, bringing the sample size down to
396—prior to removing participants who failed the control.
5.2 Materials
Note that the scenarios employed in experiment 2 took half as many words
to present as the scenarios in experiment 1.
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5.2.1 Control check: “short”
e control check consisted of a pair of scenarios.ese both had a morally
OK valence and the sentence “Jake is small” was used in both to make a
statement about an 8-year-old boy who is typical in size for an 8-year-old
boy. However, in one scenario, what is at issue is whether Jake is small for
his age, whereas in the other scenario, what is at issue is whether Jake is
small enough (amongst a group of much older boys) to t through a hole in
a fence. We expect the sentence to be judged false in the rst case and true
in the second.e scenarios were as follows:
Control: Morally OK and False
Jake is 8 years old. He is typical in size for an 8-year-old boy.
Sam wrongly thinks Jake is signicantly smaller than the aver-
age 8-year-old boy. Sam asserts to Jake’s father, “Jake is small.
You should take him to a doctor.”
Control: Morally OK and true
Jake is 8 years old. He is typical in size for an 8-year-old boy.
Jake is playing soccer with a group of much older, and so larger,
boys. e ball goes over the fence. Jake is the only one small
enough to t through a gap in the fence to retrieve the ball.
Martin, an older boy, asserts, “Jake is small. He could get the
ball.”
“Short” is a relative gradable adjective, and so expected to exhibit a context-
sensitivity which is in principle susceptible to inuence from the moral va-
lence of context.
5.2.2 “a lot of cake”
e contrast in moral valence between the two scenarios with the topic “a
lot of cake” lay in whether the target sentence was being used to continue to
cause an already bratty child to be bratty, or instead, to praise a child who
is dying of cancer, and who is not at all bratty. In each case, the sentence
“that’s a lot of cake” is used to make a statement about two sponge cakes.
e dierently valenced cake topic scenarios were as follows:
Morally Bad
BecauseChad’smeek parents praise absolutely everythingChad
makes, Chad is fast becoming an insuerable brat. Today Chad
made two sponge cakes. Once again, keen to please his son,
Chad’s father asserts, “Wow Chad! at’s a lot of cake.” He
thereby encourages Chad’s bratty behaviour.
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Morally OK
Andy is a young, good hearted boy who is dying of cancer. He’s
oen very sad. One day he makes two sponge cakes. Ben sees
the cakes and is impressed. Ben asserts, “Wow Andy! at’s a
lot of a cake.” Ben thereby makes Andy very happy indeed.
“a lot of cake” is not a gradable adjective. But it plausibly is context-sensitive
with respect to how much cake constitutes a lot of cake in pretty much the
same ways that relative gradable adjectives are. Firstly, a given quantity of
cake might be small, say, for a wedding, but large for grandma’s desert.e
threshold of quantity for constituting a lot of cake may thus vary with con-
text. Secondly, the scale used to measure quantity may be dierent in dif-
ferent contexts. For one example, consider the exchange cited by Pomerantz
(1984, 77) in her conversational analytic study of agreement and disagree-
ment. B says, “that’s not an awful lot of fruitcake” which is met with silence
by the person who is selling the fruitcake (the insinuation being that the
fruitcake is being sold at an expensive rate).e speaker then adopts a dif-
ferent scale for measuring the quantity of fruitcake (rather than focusing on
physical mass, the speaker turns to howmuch you need in order to feel full):
“Course it is. A little piece goes a long way.”us we expect “a lot of cake” to
exhibit the context-sensitivity required for contextual factors such as moral
valence to shape the content of the expression in context.
5.2.3 “old”
e contrast in valence between the two “old” scenarios lay in whether the
sentence “the hospital is old” was being used to justify knocking down a
much-needed hospital in order to build a new, better equipped hospital, or
instead to justify knocking down a much-needed hospital in order to make
way for a casino run by gangsters. e hospital spoken of in each case was
40 years old.
Morally Bad
emuch-needed children’s hospital was built 40 years ago.e
mob wants the children’s hospital to be knocked down so they
can build their casino. When arguing that the hospital should
be knocked down, the mob asserts to the city planning com-
mittee, “e children’s hospital is old.”
Morally OK
emuch-needed children’s hospital was built 40 years ago.e
mayor is going to replace the hospital with one that provides
better treatments to more children. When arguing that the cur-
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rent hospital should be knocked down, the mayor asserts to the
planning committee, “e children’s hospital is old.”
“old” is a relative gradable adjective andwas for this reason used in the target
sentence.
5.3 Arrangement
e six scenarios (three topics, each with two valences) were, as in exper-
iment 1, presented in an almost random order: “almost” because controls
never appeared rst. Notice that all target sentences are positive in polar-
ity. Again, as in experiment 1, for each scenario (of each moral valence),
two questions were asked (though this time in the reverse order). e rst
question asked the participant to assess the truth of the target sentence.e
second question checked the participant’s interpretation of the moral va-
lence of the scenario. Both answers were to be given using a sliding scale.
For example, in the cake scenario, the following questions were asked:
Truth-value judgement
Is Ben’s assertion “at’s a lot of cake” true?[SCALE LABELS: FALSE — TRUE]
Moral Valence Check
Do you agree with the following statement? “It is morally prob-
lematic for Ben to make Andy happy by praising Andy’s cake-
making.”[SCALE LABELS: DISAGREE — AGREE]
5.4 Results
Participants were excluded on the basis of the control scenarios if they did
not judge the true sentence true (placing the marker on the scale higher
than halfway), and the false sentence false (placing the marker on the scale
lower than halfway). 250 participants passed the control. Everyone else was
excluded from subsequent analysis.
5.4.1 “cake” scenarios
Participants were excluded if they did not rate the scenario with nominally
bad moral valence as morally bad, and the scenario with nominally OK
moral valence as morally OK.is further reduced the sample size to 212—
substantially larger than the 31 and 93 who exhibited the expected judge-
ments of moral valence in experiment 1.
Table 5 and Figure 5 present the distributions of truth-value judgements
for the within-subject comparison for the cake scenarios for the two moral
valences:
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Morally Bad Morally OK
Maximum Value 100 100
ird Quartile 93.5 99.25
Median 75 81
First Quartile 50.75 67.75
Minimum Value 1 1
Table 5.
Figure 5.
A one-tailedWilcoxon signed-rank test did reveal the truth-value judge-
ments given in the morally bad condition to be signicantly lower than the
truth-value judgements given in the morally OK condition (n = 212, V =
3063.5, α = 0.05/4, p = 0.0000000003681). e eect size was small (r =
0.22). is is reected in the violin plot (gure 5). In the morally OK con-
dition, responses are more clustered toward the 100 (i.e. “true”) end of the
spectrum of possible answers than in the morally bad condition, where the
density of answers is comparatively thicker towards the 0 (i.e. “false”) end of
the spectrum of possible answers.
Table 6 and Figure 6 present the distributions of truth-value judgements
for between-subject comparison for the twomoral valences for the cake sce-
nario:
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Morally Bad Morally OK
Maximum Value 100 100
ird Quartile 96 89.25
Median 75 78
First Quartile 47 67
Minimum Value 1 4
Table 6.
Figure 6.
A one-tailedWilcoxon rank-sum test did not nd the truth-value judge-
ments given in response to the scenario with morally bad valence (prior to
seeing any other scenario) to be signicantly lower (i.e. closer to 0/“false”)
than the truth-value judgements given in response to the scenario with
morally OK valence (prior to seeing any other scenario) (n1 = 48, n2 = 58,
W = 1227.5, α = 0.05/4, p = 0.1477).
5.4.2 “old” scenarios
Participants were excluded if their interpretations of the moral valence of
the old scenarios did not dier across the scenarios with nominally dierent
moral valences. is reduced the sample size to 220—again substantially
larger than the 31 and 93 who passed the controls in experiment 1.
Table 7 and Figure 7 present the distributions of truth-value judgements
given in the old scenarios for the two moral valences for the within-subject
comparisons:
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Morally Bad Morally OK
Maximum Value 100 100
ird Quartile 93 100
Median 77 85
First Quartile 36 61.75
Minimum Value 1 1
Table 7.
Figure 7.
A one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test did nd the truth-value judge-
ments given in the morally bad condition to be signicantly lower than the
truth-value judgements given in the morally OK condition (n = 220, V =
2936, α = 0.05/4, p = 0.000000000001707). e eect size was small
(r = 0.21).us, as in gure 5, we can see again in gure 7, that the negative
moral valence of the scenario pushesmany of the responses that were packed
around 100/“true” (where the density of responses is greatest in the morally
OKcondition) downwards, thickening the density of responses below 50 (i.e.
“false” responses), and thinning the most extreme responses around the 100
mark (i.e. strong “true” responses).
Table 8 and gure 8 present the distributions of truth-value judgements
given in the old scenarios for the twomoral valences for the between-subject
comparisons:
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Morally Bad Morally OK
Maximum Value 100 100
ird Quartile 94 100
Median 78 88
First Quartile 31.75 65.5
Minimum Value 1 1
Table 8.
Figure 8.
A one-tailedWilcoxon rank-sum test did not nd the truth-value judge-
ments given in response to the scenario with morally bad valence (prior to
seeing any other scenarios) to be signicantly lower than the truth-value
judgements given in response to the scenariowithmorallyOKvalence (prior
to seeing any other scenarios) (n1 = 48, n2 = 58, W = 1096, α = 0.05/4,
p = 0.0416).
5.5 Discussion
ere appears then to be evidence consistent with Díaz-León’s proposal. If a
sentence is used to justify a morally suspect act, then people are less inclined
to judge the sentence true.is is just what we would expect if the character
of a context-sensitive word (e.g. the function SIMILAR in our rendering of
Saul’s contextualist analysis of the meaning of “woman”) makes the content
of the relevant word depend in part upon moral features of the context, as
Díaz-León proposes.
No such eect was found for between-subject comparisons. It would
however obviously be amistake to conclude from this that when participants
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were unaware that the dierently valenced contexts were inuencing their
truth-value judgements, they were unaected by the dierences of valence
(as if only the opportunity to explicitly contrast the dierently valenced con-
texts was responsible for the dierential responses). As indicated by the pre-
experiment power analysis, the sample sizes for the between-subject com-
parisons were simply too small for the experiment to be powerful enough
to detect an eect comparable to the size of the eect found in the within-
subject comparisons.
Nonetheless, the within-subject nding is interesting. Within-subject
designs allowparticipants tomake comparisons between dierent scenarios,
and that means, they are more likely to be aware of the dierences between
the scenarios with which they are presented. Participants are therefore more
likely to bemore aware of what features of the context (if any) are inuencing
their truth-value judgements (for helpful discussion of this issue see Hansen
2014). If we had found that eects arise only if participants were unaware of
the eect context was having on their judgements, it would seem that par-
ticipants do not think any such eect is legitimate; in short, it would look
as though they considered it a form of bias—to allow their judgements to
be inuenced by context in the way it was being inuenced. But this is not
what happened. Even in the within-subject comparisons (wherein, it seems
likely that participants will recognize what contextual dierences are aect-
ing their judgements), it is nonetheless the case that people have a tendency
to disfavour ascription of a content to a sentence in context if the sentence’s
having that content has morally suspect consequences. e appearance of
this eect in the within-subject comparison suggests that this inuence is
not considered a form of bias. Rather, even when participants are aware that
moral considerations are inuencing their judgements, they continue to al-
low such considerations to have that inuence.
However, the eect is indeed small. Given that contexts of speech and in-
terpretation are lledwith other inuential factors, onewonders what would
happen to this weak eect when those other factors are modulated. Pursuit
of this question would require a dierent kind of experimental design. Al-
though this does not mean that we do not have evidence consistent with
Díaz-León’s proposal, one may wonder about its utility to her, given her di-
alectical position with respect to Saul. For what Díaz-León sought was not
just some eect ofmoral valence upon content, but an eect that would show
denials that trans women are women to be false. What we can see from our
data is that although bad moral valence can drag truth-value judgements
closer to absolute falsity, the shi is not large. Notice that in the violin plots
which present statistically signicant dierences (viz. gures 5 and 7), we
do not see a wholesale shi of the largest bulge from the top to the bottom
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of the 50-point marker: we do not see a majority judging the target sen-
tences true in the morally OK valenced scenario, and a majority judging the
target sentences false in the morally bad valenced scenario. We instead see
in the morally bad valanced scenarios a thinning of the bulge that we see
in the morally OK valenced scenarios, and a slight thickening of the bulge
of responses over the other side of the 50-point divide between true and
false. Although some people are wholesale changing their judgements from
true to false, a large proportion of respondents maintained the same truth-
value judgement across the two moral valences. If moral meta-semantic en-
croachment is going to save Saul from impermissibly rejecting an empirical
semantic hypothesis because of her political and ethical beliefs, we need the
encroachment to be stronger than this. For it is only then that we should
expect that when speakers are presented with what Saul and Díaz-León take
to be the moral factors surrounding gender, speakers will agree that denials
that trans women are women are false.
6. Limitations and Future Work
We close the paper by describing four limitations of the current study, and
what these limitations imply about fruitful directions for future research.
One major limitation of this study is the possibility that other factors
besides moral valence are systematically dierent between the two moral
valences of each topic. If they are, they could be responsible for any detected
eect. is is a problem for any attempt to support a moral encroachment
hypothesis (for instance the same problem arises for Fritz 2017). e prob-
lem arises because it is dicult to identify and distinguish moral from non-
moral contextual factors. A more sophisticated experimental design—one
which facilitated multivariate analysis—would be required in order to bet-
ter understand possible interactions and “screening-o” eects of dierent
contextual factors operating in concert upon the truth-value judgements of
language users.
A second limitation is that we did notmanage to collect sucient data to
examine the occurrence (if any) of meta-linguistic moral encroachment for
the specic word that interested Díaz-León viz. “woman”. In general, future
work that tests a much larger range of expressions for the inuence of moral
valence on truth-value judgements, would help to discern how systematic
meta-linguistic moral encroachment might be.
A third limitation, which has already been noted, was the failure to gen-
erate samples suciently large to be in a position to detect meta-linguistic
moral encroachment in between-subject comparisons. For this, either a
more ingenious experiment design than we have mustered on this occasion
is required, or else a much larger sample is required. e data collected for
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the between-subject comparisons is suggestive of the possibility that the ef-
fect of moral valence on truth-value judgements is stronger when partici-
pants have had no opportunity to compare themoral valences of contrasting
contexts. If this were indeed the case, we would need to re-examine the idea
that participants consider the inuence of moral valence on context to be
legitimate: for such a dierence in eect strength would be evidence against
this.
Fourth, we have adopted an assumption which is typical in the study of
linguistic context-sensitivity: that shis of truth-value judgement across the
use of the same sentence in two dierent contexts to describe a single object
which is unchanged across the two contexts are evidence of a shi in the con-
tent of the sentence. But when dealing with the inuence of moral consid-
erations upon truth-value judgements, the possibility that participants are
shiing their truth-value judgements without shiing their interpretations
of the content of the sentences employed (they are simply being inconsis-
tent in the use of a single content across the two contexts) becomes more
salient. We know of two kinds of experiment which have been performed in
the past which check for shis of interpretation without inferring such shis
from shis in truth-value judgement. Firstly, a range of experiments in social
psychology have directly asked participants to select between interpretations
of presented linguistic stimuli (cf. Asch 1940, Asch 1948, Hayes et al. 2018,
Pool et al. 1998, andWood et al. 1996). Secondly, Hansen and Chemla (2017)
test for shis in judgements about the entailments of a sentence, rather than
judgements about a sentence’s actual truth (relative to a described scenario).
Díaz-León’s proposal implies that a syllogism like “Only women are allowed
in this bathroom. X is a trans woman. So, X is not allowed in this bath-
room” should be judged invalid when the moral consequences of forcing
trans women to use men’s public bathrooms are signicantly negative. Use
of either or both of these methods would help to set aside the concern that
the small eect in truth-value judgement detected in experiment 2 does not
reect a bona de shi in truth-conditional content.
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